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Abstract
We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance
(UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unem-
ployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative
static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI ben-
eÖts on unemployed workersí decision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus
on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard compli-
cations. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their
time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the
presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remu-
nerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a
new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the
amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show
that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts de-
creases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the
e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal
e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance
payments mechanism.
Keywords: Unemployment insurance, informal sector, income e§ects, develop-
ing countries.
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1 Introduction
In the past three decades, papers dealing with the optimal design of unemployment
insurance (UI hereafter) have covered a large number of issues, at the corner of infor-
mation economics and labor economics (Karni, 2000). In spite of this huge literature,
very few studies have analyzed the consequences of UI beneÖts on labor markets charac-
terized by important informal sectors. Indeed, developing countriesí dual labor markets
may generate a high obstacle and may reduce the desirability of an UI program. As
pointed out in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1999) and Alvarez-Parra and Sanchez (2009),
the incentives problem becomes much stronger if the State is not able to control the
unemployed status, i.e. if unemployed works in the informal sector while receiving UI
beneÖts. This pessimistic view is eloquently expressed in Mazza (2000) for IADB: "The
preliminary evidence gathered from Latin American and Eastern European cases is that
the presence of a large informal sector may undermine the utility of UI, by making it
impossible to insure that recipients are looking for new work, and may provide perverse
incentives to increase further the informal sector...much more systematic study is needed
and recommended by this study before Örmer conclusions can be drawn".
To our knowledge, only Alvarez-Parra and Sanchez (2009)ís analysis formally deals
with the consequences of UI in the presence of "hidden market". Their paper adopts
a sophisticated mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal dynamic UI
contract in a partial equilibrium set-up. We share with Alvarez-Parra and Sanchez
(2009) the partial equilibrium set-up, but we suppose that policyholdersí preferences
are represented by a non separable utility function. Moreover, in line with the labor
economic approach, we consider a simpler comparative static analysis in which we only
focus on the current e§ect of the UI beneÖts on the e§ort undertaken by unemployed
workers. Roughly speaking, we assume away the traditional moral hazard issue in
order to focus on the consequences of the current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersí
decision variables during the same period.1 It is worth noticing that in case of one-shot
UI beneÖts, there is no moral hazard and only this intra-temporal e§ect intervenes.2
This new insight is particularly relevant if we take into account that one-shot UI beneÖts
is a characteristic pertaining to several developing countries.3
In our setting, when a formal worker loses his job, he becomes unemployed and can
1This intra-temporal trade-o§ would still be present in a dynamic setting but should coexist with
moral hazard e§ect generated by the UI beneÖts of the following period.The moral hazard problem
occurs because of the e§ect of UI beneÖts paid in t + 1 on the e§ort undertaken in period t. More
precisely, UI beneÖts received in period t + 1 generate moral hazard e§ects on the decision variables
undertaken during period t. The intra-temporal e§ect focuses on the interplay between the current UI
beneÖts and the current decisions undertaken.
2At least, as long as we do not consider that workers are able to modify their probability to loose
their current job.
3Most of the time, one-shot UI corresponds to severance payments or conditional saving mechanisms.
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devote his Öxed total time to several activities. In a Örst step, we consider the (intra-
temporal) trade-o§ between e§ort to secure a new employment in the formal sector and
leisure. In a second step, the unemployed worker may also spend time to obtain income
in the informal sector in which there is no rationing. Consequently, the unemployedís
time constraint implies an opportunity cost associated to the time spent to secure a new
job in the formal sector or to leisure activities. However, another e§ect also appears:
thanks to UI beneÖts, unemployed workers may have less need to spend time on informal
remunerated activities. This e§ect is close to the liquidity constraint pointed out by
Chetty (2008).
We show that without informal sector, the introduction or the increase of UI beneÖts
yield ambiguous results. More precisely, it may increase the e§ort made to secure a new
formal job when consumption and leisure are substitute. On the contrary, when unem-
ployed workers have the possibility to spend time on informal remunerated activities, the
introduction or the increase of UI beneÖts paid during period t always increases
the current e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. It
is due to the fact that UI beneÖts decreases the marginal opportunity cost generated
by e§ort (undertaken to secure a new job). The ambiguity previously mentioned, i.e.
without informal sector, now only intervene at the level of the (intra-temporal) trade-o§
between informal activities and leisure. To summarize, in case of one-shot UI beneÖts
or severance payments, one can conclude that at a microeconomic level, an increase of
these beneÖts do not reduce e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector, whereas
it may occur without an informal sector. In such a case, when time spent on informal
activity increases, it is at the expense of leisure activities.
2 The Model
Consider a representative agent in a situation of short term unemployment. The agent
may secure a new job with probability  with a corresponding value V e in the following
period, or on the contrary, becomes a long term unemployed with a value V l.4 His
instantaneous utility function u(c; L) depends on consumption c and leisure L, with
uc > 0 and uL > 0, ucc < 0 and uLL < 0. Denoting by  the discount factor, the value
function for the short term unemployed is
V s = u(c; L) + 
h
V e + (1 )V l
i
:
We assume that the representative agent has one unit of time to allocate and that
the e§ort to secure a new job is measured on this time scale. This e§ort has a positive
e§ect on the probability to secure a new job, but with decreasing return, i.e. 0(a)  0
4See Cahuc and Lehman (2000) for a similar framework.
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and 00(a)  0.  is the replacement rate and wf the income earned before losing his job
during the current period, so that wf is the UI beneÖt received by recent unemployed
workers.
In the following periods, we consider that there is no UI beneÖts and assume that V e
is exogenously determined by the condition of the labor markets and V l is independent
of current UI beneÖts. Roughly speaking, we do not take into account the general
equilibrium e§ect caused by the reduction of the employedaí utility due to the necessary
tax to fund the short term unemployment program. Moreover, if after the Örst period,
unemployed workers have not found a formal job, V l does not depend either on the
unemployment program. These assumptions allow us to assume away the traditional
moral hazard e§ect that comes from the recursive structure of dynamic UI contracts in
order to focus on the intra-temporal e§ect at work.5
First, we consider the situation where there is no informal sector. Next, an unem-
ployed worker may spend time on a remunerated activity in the informal sector.
2.1 Without informal sector
When there is no informal sector, the agent splits his time between leisure L and e§ort
a to secure a new job, i.e. 1 = L + a. The instantaneous utility function thus writes
u(wf ; 1 a). The value function of the short term unemployed can be rewritten as
V s = u(wf ; 1 a) + 
h
(a)V e + (1 (a))V l
i
:
Let us deÖne a  argmaxV S . Assuming an interior solution, the Örst order condi-
tion gives:
uL(wf ; 1 a) + 0(a)
h
V e  V l
i
= 0;
where uL refers to marginal utility of leisure.6 This equation shows that the e§ort
depends on two factors: an income e§ect due the unemployment beneÖts (wf ) and the
di§erence between levels of utility

V eV l in the next period. Proposition 1 shows the
importance of the cross derivative on the relationship between current UI beneÖts and
the e§ort undertaken.
Proposition 1 The sign of da=d is determined by the sign of uLc(:), where uLc
denotes the cross derivative.
5 It is worth noticing that a dynamic UI contract would involve di§erent replacement rate t1, t
and t+1, etc... However, an increase of t would generate exactly the same e§ects on the unemployed
workersí decision variables in period t. The moral hazard e§ect would only modify these variables in
period t 1.
6The second order conditions are automatically satisÖed with our assumptions.
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Proof. Using the implicit function theorem and the second order condition yields
the result.
In words, in an economy without informal sector, the e§ort increases (respectively
decreases) when the marginal utility of leisure decreases (resp. increases) in the con-
sumption level.
2.2 With informal sector
We now introduce an informal sector and thus the possibility for the short term un-
employed to split his total time between leisure activity, e§ort to secure a new job in
the formal sector and a remunerated activity in the informal sector where there is no
rationing. In such a case, the unemployedís time constraint becomes: a + L + e = 1,
where e denotes the time devoted to informal activity. Moreover, the remuneration per
unit of time in the informal sector is wi, with wi < wf . The value function of the short
term unemployed now writes
V s = u(wf + wie; 1 e a) + 
h
(a)V e + (1 (a))V l
i
:
Let us deÖne (a; e)  argmaxV s. Assuming interior solutions, the Örst order
conditions with respect to a and e are respectively
uL(wf + wie; 1 e  a) + 0(a)
h
V e  V l
i
= 0; (1)
uL(wf + wie; 1 e  a) + wiuc(wf + wie; 1 e  a) = 0: (2)
Proposition 2 In the presence of an informal sector:
i) the e§ort to secure a new job always increases with the short term UI beneÖt:
da=d  0;
ii) a su¢cient condition to ensure that the time devoted to informal activity decreases
is
ucc
uc
 ucL
uL
;
Proof. See appendix.
Equation (2) states that unemployed workers choose time devoted to informal ac-
tivities to equalize its marginal utility to their marginal utility of leisure. Mazza (2000)
mentions that the introduction of UI beneÖts in developing countries characterized by a
high level of informality can subsidize informal activities. In other words, while receiv-
ing UI beneÖts, an unemployed may work in the informal sector. Proposition 2 reveals
that in presence of an informal sector, current UI beneÖts unambiguously increase the
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e§ort made by the unemployed worker to secure a new job in the formal sector, whereas
this e§ect is ambiguous without informal sector. Unlike models that do not introduce
an informal sector, the ambiguity does not a§ect the e§ort level, but rather the intra-
temporal trade-o§ between leisure and informal productive activities. In other terms,
in the case where time devoted to an informal activity increases, it is at the expense of
leisure.
This result can be understood as follows. Combining (1) and (2), we obtain
wiuc(w
f + wie; 1 e  a) = 0(a)
h
V e  V l
i
:
The RHS captures the marginal beneÖt of the e§ort to secure a new job in the
formal sector due to the variation of the probability . The LHS represents the marginal
opportunity cost of this e§ort, because it implies less time devoted to informal activity
and therefore less income coming from the informal sector. The unemployed worker
chooses his e§ort to equalize its marginal beneÖt to its marginal cost. The concavity of
the utility function with respect to consumption implies that the marginal (opportunity)
cost decreases with the available income of the unemployed. Consequently, an increase
of UI beneÖts increases the unemployed workerís e§ort to secure a job in the formal
sector.7 Condition ii) implies that if leisure and consumption are complement, it is a
su¢cient condition to guarantee that an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases the
time devoted to informal activity. If it is not the case, a weaker su¢cient condition
can be established as long as the policyholdersí absolute risk aversion is high enough.8
Finally, it is worth noticing that the e§ect of UI beneÖts on the informal activity depends
mainly on the extent of the decreasing return of search activity and the time salary wi
earned in the informal sector.
3 Conclusion
In this note, we show that an increase of current UI beneÖts does not reduce the e§ort
made by unemployed to secure a new job in the formal sector during the same period.
The intra-temporal trade-o§ only a§ects the amount of leisure and informal activities.
This simple result may highlight that one-shot UI programs or an increase of sever-
ance payments would not necessarily have negative consequences on labor market in
developing countries.
This note can be extended in several directions. Following the labor economics
tradition, we have adopted a comparative static analysis. In line with Alvarez-Parra and
7There also exist an indirect e§ect which may go to the same direction or not according to the sign
of ucL. In all cases, it is dominated by the direct consumption e§ect.
8 It is worth noticing that ucc captures an income e§ect more than unemployedsí risk aversion.
6
Sanchez (2009), it would be useful to apply this time constraint approach in an optimal
contract setting but in a general equilibrium model that would take into account the
impact of UI beneÖts on the determination of the wage in the formal sector. The study
of dynamic contract with di§erent levels of UI beneÖts over time instead of one shot UI
beneÖts would allow to understand the interplay between this intra-temporal trade-o§
and moral hazard e§ects. It is in our research agenda.
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4 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The Örst order conditions are
Ha = uL(wf + wie; 1 e  a) + 0(a)
h
V e  V l
i
= 0;
He = uL(wf + wie; 1 e  a) + wiuc(wf + wie; 1 e  a) = 0:
Applying the Cramerís rule yields
da
d
=
1
jHj
"
@Ha@ @Ha@e
@He@ @He@e
#
;
=
1
jHj

wfuLc wiuLc + uLL
wfuLcwiwfucc wiuLc + uLL +

wi
2
ucc  wiucL

;
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where jHj denotes the determinant of the Hessian matrix. It yields
da
d
=
1
jHj
h
wiwf (uLc)2 + wfuLcuLL + wfuLc

wi
2
ucc  wfuLcwiucL
+wfwi (uLc)
2  wfuLcuLL 

wi
2
wfuccuLc + w
iwfuccuLL
i
;
=
wiwf
jHj
h
uccuLL  (uLc)2
i
 0:
Similarly, we have
de
d
=
1
jHj
"
@Ha
@a @Ha@
@He
@a @He@
#
;
=
1
jHj

uLL + 
00
(a)

V e  V l wfuLc
uLL  wiucL wfuLc  wiwfucc

:
Straightforward computations yield
de
d
=
1
jHj
h
wfuLcuLL + 
00
(a)
h
V e  V l
i
wfuLc  uLLwiwfucc
00(a)
h
V e  V l
i
wiwfucc  wfuLLuLc + wiwfu2cL
i
=
1
jHj


00
(a)
h
V e  V l
i
uLw
f

ucL
uL
 ucc
uc

 wiwf

uLLucc  (ucL)2

:
Therefore, using the concavity of u(:), a su¢cient condition to have de=d  0 is
ucc
uc
 ucL
uL
:
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